VOLUME 1

Hello and welcome to the Indonesia at a Crossroads newsletter!

I’m excited to have you join me on this journey as we review and analyze President Prabowo’s policies over the next five years.

I have so many ideas for how I will run the newsletter. One thing I’ve been considering is involving other writers, especially Gen-Z contributors, if we have the budget in the future. For now, with a budget of zero, what I can offer is a biweekly newsletter.

As promised, I will write a newsletter on Prabowo’s administration. In the first week, I will focus on political or economic issues. In the second week, I will cover environmental and human rights issues, which I believe are intertwined.

This newsletter will be different from others. I want it to become the best source for both Indonesian and foreign readers. I will try my best to include both local and international angles. The aim is to bridge the information gap between Indonesian and foreign readers.

Lets start with volume 1.

Politics: The Brown Party in Indonesia Elections

You may have read about Pramono Anung and Rano Karno’s victory in the Jakarta governor election, but they weren’t the real focus for Indonesian readers. It was clear that PDIP, the opposition party that nominated Pramono, would strike back after losing the presidential race to Koalisi Indonesia Maju, backed by Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo.

After Jokowi’s terms ended, Indonesian politics has been shaped primarily by the rivalry between PDIP and Koalisi Indonesia Maju. Notably, PDIP distanced itself from Jokowi after he refused to endorse the party’s candidate and instead supported Koalisi Indonesia Maju’s candidate, Prabowo Subianto. A key battleground for this rivalry has been the simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada Serentak) held across 37 provinces and 508 regencies/cities.

While PDIP claimed victory in 14 provinces, including Jakarta and West Papua, it lost to Koalisi Indonesia Maju in crucial regions like West, Central, and East Java. Experts noted that PDIP lost much of its voter support after parting ways with Jokowi.

However, this may not be the only factor. According to Yoyok Riyo Sudibyo, a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives from the Nasdem Party, there was allegedly a “Brown Party” operation aimed at paving the way for Koalisi Indonesia Maju’s regional election candidates to win. The term “Brown Party” later came to refer to the Indonesian National Police, with opposition politicians believing that Jokowi used his power and influence to mobilize this institution for his political goals.

Following Jokowi’s moves to involve the police, the Secretary-General of PDIP, Hasto Kristiyanto, openly stated that democracy in Indonesia is facing a very serious problem due to Jokowi’s power ambitions to build his political dynasty, including nominating his son for the position of vice president, his son-in-law to be mayor of Medan city, and other candidates from Koalisi Indonesia Maju.

Jokowi’s involvement with the police was extensively discussed by a group of investigative journalists from Majalah Tempo in their podcast Bocor Alus titled “Jokowi’s Grip and the Police Against PDIP Candidates in the Regional Elections.”

Four regions that became the focus of Tempo’s coverage were North Sumatra, Banten, Central and East Java Provinces.

Excerpt from the reporting:

Central Java: Police were allegedly using their authority to question village heads regarding village fund budgets ahead of the regional elections (Pilkada). According to a Tempo reporter, a village head admitted that the police asked why they weren’t supporting candidates backed by the Koalisi Indonesia Maju. Over 200 village officials, village heads, and civil servants were summoned by the police for questioning about village funds between March and October 2024, often without legal clarity. Police were also allegedly asking them to produce and put up banners for certain candidates, take photographs of the banners, and submit reports.

Medan, North Sumatra: Jokowi’s son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, was accused of using the police to intimidate village heads through the Bhabinkamtibmas (Community Police Officers). The method was similar to that used in Central Java: village heads were summoned and asked to mobilize support for Bobby, targeting at least 60% of the eligible voters in their villages. Each voter was reportedly promised a sum of money.

Read full report on Tempo’s coverage on the issue here.

The mobilization of village heads across Indonesia to secure votes for regional election candidates is not a new phenomenon. In every election, village heads are vulnerable to being used as political tools to support certain candidates. However, the situation worsens when the police, as law enforcers, interfere and instruct village heads to engage in practical politics. The consequence of such interference is the potential for criminalization.

Days after the regional elections, people have begun discussing the elected regional heads, most of whom come from political elites who have long held power in Indonesian politics, either within political parties or among wealthy business groups. Independent figures are in the minority, and their numbers continue to shrink each year.

Two political analysts, both from Indonesia and abroad, whose analyses are worth noting, are Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Ian Wilson.

In his latest analysis published by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, titled Indonesia’s Regional Elections: Electoral Competition Limited By Cartel Politics, Burhanuddin explicitly states that regional elections are dominated by political cartels. This practice, which has already become a pattern in national elections, has also appeared in regional elections, according to Burhan.

For example, Burhan highlights the following: “In an effort to obtain and secure ministerial post quotas or other strategic positions in the Prabowo government, political parties had been willing to follow the agreement struck with Gerindra by supporting regional candidates whom Prabowo’s party had endorsed and nominated, especially in strategic areas.”

Burhanuddin is referring to how members of the Koalisi Indonesia Maju have joined forces with Gerindra, the ruling party, to challenge the opposition party, PDIP, which shapes Indonesian politics today.

Ian Wilson, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism at Murdoch University, also discusses this issue of political cartels. He specifically addresses how the cartels reduce the value of democracy, therefore the level of participation of the voters in the 2024 regional elections is at the lowest in history. Listen to his analysis on Talking Indonesia Podcast.

The debate over the regional elections reached an anti-climax when Prabowo proposed that regional heads should no longer be elected by the people, but rather by the legislative body. This suggestion comes after claims that the simultaneous regional elections drained the budget, reaching Rp37 trillion in the 2024 elections. Many analysts consider this proposal dangerous.

What do you think should be improved? Should the law be amended to prevent political cartels, open up broader opportunities for independent candidates, or return regional elections to the hands of the DPR as in the New Order era? Let me know what you think.

Geopolitics: Prabowo between the US and China

Meanwhile, international media coverage mostly focused on Prabowo’s geopolitical strategy. I think many journalists and experts are still trying to figure out whether Prabowo moves during the visit in the US and China signal our stand. But none of these articles convinces what the Jakarta plan actually is. Some are guessing that it is more of a Prabowo gesture, he just wants to impress both parties as the new elected president, but others are seeing Prabowo administration will move closer to China and Russia.

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Cheers,

Indonesia at a Crossroads team